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ABSTRACT 
 
  The objective of this is to develop a Fuzzy aided Application layer Semantic 
Intrusion Detection System (FASIDS) which works in the application layer of the network 
stack. FASIDS consist of semantic IDS and Fuzzy based IDS. Rule based IDS looks for the 
specific pattern which is defined as malicious. A non-intrusive regular pattern can be 
malicious if it occurs several times with a short time interval. For detecting such malicious 
activities, FASIDS is proposed in this paper.  At application layer, HTTP traffic’s header 
and payload are analyzed for possible intrusion.  In the proposed misuse detection module, 
the semantic intrusion detection system works on the basis of rules that define various 
application layer misuses that are found in the network. An attack identified by the IDS is 
based on a corresponding rule in the rule-base. An event that doesn’t make a ‘hit’ on the 
rule-base is given to a Fuzzy Intrusion Detection System (FIDS) for further analysis.  
         
Keywords: Semantic Intrusion detection, Application Layer misuse detector, Fuzzy 
Intrusion detection, Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping, HTTP intrusion detection.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring computers or networks for 
unauthorized entrance, activity, or file modification. Most of the commercially 
available Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) work in the network layer of the 
protocol stack. This paves way for attackers to intrude at various other layers, 
especially in the application layer namely HTTP. Application layer based IDS 
blocks the application layer based attacks that network layer intrusion detection 
system can’t block. Firewalls works in network layer and prevents the attacks 
entering the network through unauthorized port. Some complex threats can enter 
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through authorized port (HTTP 80) and they go undetected. These threats can be 
detected by Application layer IDS. Misuse detection uses rule based detection that 
follow a signature-match approach where attacks are identified by matching each 
input text or pattern against predefined signatures that model malicious activity 
(Krugel and Toth 2003). The pattern-matching process is time-consuming. 
Moreover, attackers are continuously creating new types of attacks. These attacks 
can be detected by the IDS, if it knows about the attack in the form of signatures. 
Attack signatures can be specified either in a single-line or by using complex script 
languages and are used in rule base to detect attacks. Because of the continuously 
changing nature of attacks, signatures and rules should be updated periodically on 
IDS.  
 
Rule-based Intrusion Detection System (RIDS) looks for specific pattern that 
are defined as malicious. A non-intrusive regular pattern can be malicious if it 
occurs several times with a short time interval. The non-intrusive patterns are 
checked by the fuzzy component of the proposed architecture for a possible attack. 
The detection rate increases by checking the non-intrusive patterns using the fuzzy 
component. This thesis proposes a Fuzzy aided Semantic Intrusion Detection 
System (FASIDS) which aims at designing the above solution for one of the 
application layer protocols namely HTTP (Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol). Such an 
HTTP based semantic IDS detects both the header based attacks and payload (which 
typically consists of HTML and script) based malicious content. 
 
2. ARCHITECTURE OF THE FASIDS 
 
The architecture of the Intrusion Detection System is shown in  
Figure 1. The block diagram shows the order in which the different modules process 
the incoming HTTP traffic. An HTTP sniffer collects the application-layer HTTP 
traffic from the network. It is a typical proxy server which listens through the 
network interface by getting requests from the browser and forwarding the same to 
the service provider. The response obtained from the web server is also captured by 
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the sniffer before being forwarded to the browser. Captured data is then separated 
into header and payload parts by session dispatcher.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Block diagram view of integrated FASIDS 
 
The Header Analyzer reads the header and prepares a list of the objects in the 
HTTP packets. Each object represents a field of the HTTP protocol and is a five 
tuple <message-line, section, feature, operator, content>. This sequence of objects is 
given to the IDS interpreter that refers to the rule-base and correlates the different 
objects to trigger one or more rules. BNF grammar for HTTP in the application layer 
is designed to cater to the needs of semantic intrusion detection. Simultaneously the 
Payload Analyzer parses the HTML data and searches for misappropriate usage of 
tags and attributes and also checks for JavaScript based attacks injected in the HTTP 
(Mogul et al 1999). The payload analyzer also gives its inputs to the IDS interpreter. 
The state transition analysis is done by defining states for every match. The 
incoming pattern is semantically looked-up only in specified states, and this 
increases the efficiency of the IDS pattern-matching algorithm. If the pattern 
matches with some predefined pattern then it generates intrusion alert to 
client/server.  
 
In a Rule-based intrusion detection system, an attack can either be detected if 
a rule is found in the rule base or goes undetected if not found. If this is combined 
with FIDS, the intrusions went undetected by RIDS can further be detected. These 
non-intrusive patterns are checked by the fuzzy IDS for a possible attack. The non-
intrusive patterns are normalized and converted as linguistic variable in fuzzy sets. 
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These values are given to Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping (FCM) (Susan M. Bridges 
2002).. If there is any suspicious event, then it generates an alarm to the 
client/server. FASIDS results show better performance in terms of the detection rate 
and the time taken to detect. The detection rate is increased with reduction in false 
positive rate for a specific attack. 
 
3. HTTP RULE-BASE 
3.1  Header Analyzer 
 
Header Analyzer involves many modules as explained below and depicted in 
Figure 2. 
 
HTTP Parser 
 
After receiving the message from the sniffer, the HTTP parser opens the file 
and processes it as per the sequence of steps enumerated. 
 
a.  HTTP lexer matches the text from the sniffer with the predefined 
RFC2616 HTTP specification and provides their equivalent tokens 
(Mogul et al 1999). 
b.  The parser takes the output of the lexer (i.e., the tokens) and checks 
for violations of specifications and reports if found.  
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Figure 2 Header Analyzer 
The output of the HTTP parser is in the form of text and contains various headers 
and values with a special character ($) as a delimiter. The content of the file is as 
given below (Line numbers are given for clarity). 
 
 1… Request_Method$GET 
 2… Request_Request-URI$/index.htm 
 3… Request_HTTP-version$HTTP/1.1 
 4… generic-header_Accept$image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, 
image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-  
shockwave-flash, application/vnd.ms-excel, 
application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, 
application/msword, */* 
 5… generic-header_Accept-Language$en-us 
 6… generic-header_Accept-Encoding$gzip, deflate 
 7…  generic-header_User-Agent$Mozilla/4.0  
(compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 
 8… generic-header_Host$192.168.0.51:4556 
  9…  generic-header_Connection$Keep-Alive 
    
Interpreter 
 
A lexer matches the formatted output from the HTTP parser and state 
transition analysis is done by defining states for every match. For example, 
REQLINE_URI is the state that is acquired when the lexer matches with the 
attribute string ‘URI’ before its value is encountered. Interpreter refers rule-base and 
correlates different objects to trigger one or more rules. 
 
Rule-base 
 
In the rule-base, each object is associated with a rule as explained below. 
 
a.  Object  
 
Each occurrence or a match of a simple elementary pattern is associated with 
an object which is defined as shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1 Object Definition 
 
Field May take values 
Object number Integer values 
Message-line request-line or general-header or body 
Section  
method or uri or version or host or user-agent or content-
length 
Feature type or size or regex or occurrence 
 
b.  Rules 
Each rule contains a set of objects represented by a structure which has 
Rule_number, Object_list, No_of_Objects, Message. A rule will be triggered when a 
particular set or a sequence of objects occurs. 
 
Example rules 
 
Rule 1: Object List = {1, 3, 4};  No. of objects = 3; In_order= True; 
Rule 2: Object List = {2,1,1,1,1}; No. of objects = 5; In_order= False; 
Rule 3: Object List = {3, 6, 4}; No. of objects = 3; In_order= True; 
Rule 4: Object List = {6};   No. of objects = 1; In_order= False; 
 
3.1.1 Semantic representation of rules 
 
Every time a new vulnerability is identified a new rule has to be written for it 
and is to be updated in the rule-base. The representation of the rules follows the 
BNF standard with the non-terminals and the terminals being represented in the rule 
description as shown below in Figure 3. 
 
Rules   : 1*(variable) 
Variable  : message-line  section    feature    operator    value 
Message-line : start-line | header | body 
Start-line  : Request-line | Status-line 
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Header   : Generic-hdr | Request-hdr | Response-hdr | Entity-hdr 
Body   : HTML | XML | … 
Section   : Method  |  Uri  |  Version  |  Status-code | <all the 
 generic header fields>  |<all the request header  fields>   
|<all the response header fields> |<all the  entity header 
fields> |<all the tags in the HTML doc  or other HTTP 
payload>  
Feature  : parameter  |  size  |  regex  |  occurrence  
Operator : =    |     >     |    < 
Value : 1*(Alpha |  Digit) 
Alpha : [a-zA-Z] 
Digit : [1-9] 
 
Figure 3 BNF grammar for HTTP IDS’s Rule language 
 
 
3.2    Payload Analyzer  
 
One of the major limitations in the IDSs that are commercially available is 
that they do not analyze the payload.  It is difficult to do a strict pattern matching 
over the entire packet in order to figure out the existence of certain information.  
And if the number of pattern increases, the complexity of the analysis increases. 
This leads to the necessity to perform protocol analysis (Abbes et al 2004) and apply 
specific pattern matches as is appropriate for the current part of the packet.   
 
The HTTP Sniffer captures the payload in each thread and stores it in a 
buffer for the Payload Analysis block as shown in Figure 4. The Payload in 
individual threads can be HTML documents or Scripts or Images in the web pages. 
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Figure 4  Functional Block diagram of Payload analysis 
 
If the payload is zipped, it unzips it and provides the data to the payload 
analyzer.  It parses and analyzes only the HTML and the scripts in the payload and 
leaves all the Image data, if found. The script content is checked for maliciousness. 
Table 2 shows the various combinations of Tags and Attributes where Java scripting 
attacks are generally found. Any suspicious code is reported immediately as an alert. 
 
Table 2 Specific Tags and Attributes where Java scripting attacks occur 
 
TAGS ATTRIBUTES CONTENT 
img Src Javascript: <some script> 
anchor HREF Javascript: <some script> 
input Type Javascript: <some script> 
meta Name Javascript: <some script> 
 Content 
Javascript: <some script> 
div Align 
 Class 
Javascript: <some script> 
body Bgcolor 
 Background 
Javascript: <some script> 
 Leftmargin 
iframe Align 
Javascript: <some script> 
 Src 
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4. FUZZY INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM FOR NON-INTRUSIVE 
PATTERNS 
 
The functional block diagram of fuzzy intrusion detection system is shown in 
Figure 5. Non-Intrusive patterns are given to the text processor which uses ‘awk’. 
‘awk’ is text processing language, which searches for a particular pattern in file and  
gives the number of occurrences of a particular pattern. The output of this is 
normalized between 0.0 to 1.0 and goes to fuzzification. Fuzzification converts 
normalized value into linguistic terms of fuzzy sets. The output of the fuzzification 
is given to Fuzzy Cognitive mapping which makes use of Fuzzy Associative matrix. 
This will evaluate all the rules that trigger and uses a mean of maxima 
defuzzification method to generate its actual response.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Functional blocks of FIDS 
4.1  Working of Fuzzy Cognitive Mapper in IDS 
 
Several FCM concepts are used for each kind of misuse detection where 
every “suspicious event” is a kind of misuse detection that affects the machine and 
user. The events are activated with the help of a fuzzy rule-base where fuzzy rules 
are used to map multiple inputs. The edges or links are fuzzy relations represented 
by one or more fuzzy rules. FCM makes use of Fuzzy Associate matrix to evaluate 
the rules. The output of the FCM again generates an alert to the server/client, if there 
are any attacks. 
 
4.2  Fuzzy Associative Mapping by Fuzzy Rules 
 
Fuzzy Associate Mapping (FAM) is used to map fuzzy rules in matrix 
format. These rules take two variables as input and map it into two dimensional 
Text processor Normalization Fuzzification FCM Defuzzification 
FAM 
Intrusive 
Alert to client/server 
Non-Intrusive 
Patterns 
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matrixes. An implementation of this module might use either the matrix or the 
explicit IF/THEN form. The matrix makes it easy to visualize the system. Fuzzy 
Associative Mapping shown in Table 3 allows us to conclude the rate of false 
positives for few attacks such as DoS attacks, Brute force attacks. 
 
Table 3 Fuzzy Associative Mapping for Brute Force and DoS Attack 
 
t 
x 
Very 
Small 
Small Medium High Very high 
Very low LP LP Non-
Intrusive 
Non-
Intrusive 
Non-
Intrusive 
Low LP LP LP Non-
Intrusive 
Non-
Intrusive 
Medium HP LP LP LP Non-
Intrusive 
High HP HP HP LP LP 
Very high Intrusive Intrusive HP HP HP 
 
From the Figure 6, very low, low, medium, high, very high are functions 
mapping a time scale.  
 
Figure 6 Fuzzy quantization of trapezoidal-shaped fuzzy numbers 
 
For particular time, the number of login failure is 0.2 (violet color line) and 
0.8 (green color line). It is probably fuzzy at many points. At this point, both rules 
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will trigger. It is low or very low depends on the fuzzy rules, which make use of 
FAM. If it is more “very low” than it is “low”, then “very low” rule will generate a 
stronger response. The program will evaluate all the rules that trigger and use an 
appropriate defuzzification method to generate its actual response. 
 
For example, the intruder tries to login with several users’ passwords and 
fails. This attack can be identified by observing the number of login failures and the 
time interval. FCM for Login_failure is shown in Figure 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 FCM for Login_failure 
 
 
4.3  Algorithm for Fuzzy Intrusion Detection System 
 
Step 1 :  Let x= number of login failures and t= time interval 
Step 2 :   x=normalization of (x)=(x-min)/(max-min)  
where, 
  min is the minimum value for the attribute that x belongs to  
  max is the maximum value for the attribute that x belongs to  
 
For each numerical attribute, assign the fuzzy space as shown in  
Figure 6 
 
Step 3 :  The output of the fuzzification is given to FCM which has the 
 fuzzy rules in the form: IF condition THEN consequent  
Suspicious event  
Login Failure Interval 
Same machine 
+ - 
+ 
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Where,   
Condition is a complex fuzzy expression i.e., that uses fuzzy 
 logic operators, which is shown in Table 5.2                   
Consequent is an atomic Expression 
 
Table 4 Fuzzy logic operators 
 
Logical Operator Fuzzy Operator 
x AND t Min{x,t} 
x OR t Max{x,t} 
NOT x 1.0-x 
 
R:  IF y is high and t is low 
THEN Intrusion is HP 
 
Step 4 :  Mean of Maxima defuzzification (DMM)=sum Σxi/ |X| 
             Where, xi belongs to X 
           This program will evaluate all the rules that trigger and use a mean of 
maxima defuzzification method to generate its actual response. 
 
5. ATTACKS  
 
There are numerous attacks that can be caused using JavaScript. Cross Site 
Scripting (CSS), SQL Injection, Denial of Service and Brute force are the most 
common of all (William Bellamy 2002). The attacks such as Denial of Service and 
Brute force are not detected by a regular misuse detection system. The fuzzy module 
adds value by detecting these kinds of attacks.  
 
5.1  Cross site scripting attack 
 
A web site may unintentionally include malicious HTML tags or scripts in a 
dynamically generated page based on invalidated input from untrustworthy sources. 
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This can be a problem when a web server does not adequately ensure that generated 
pages are properly encoded to prevent unintended execution of scripts, and when 
input is not validated to prevent malicious HTML from being passed to the user. By 
cross-site scripting technique it is possible for an attacker to insert malicious script 
or HTML into a web page. The purpose of cross-site scripting is that an intruder 
causes a trusted web server to send a page to a victim's browser that contains 
malicious script or HTML as desired by the intruder. The malicious script runs with 
the privileges of a trusted script originating from the trusted web server.  
 
5.2  SQL injection attack 
 
Many web pages take parameters from a web user and query the database 
using SQL. Take for instance when a user logins, the web page asks for user name 
and password and queries the database to check if a user has valid name and 
password. With SQL Injection, it is possible for an intruder to send crafted user 
name and/or password field that will modify the SQL query and thus grant him 
something else.  
 
 
 
5.3  Denial of service attack 
 
When a server is intentionally overloaded with many requests from an 
intruder, it causes it to deny normal access to legitimate users. This attack can also 
be in the form of an infinite loop that gets executed in the client’s browser. The 
malicious scripts are separated and saved in a text file. It can be given as structured 
input to the yacc code for signature comparison.  
 
5.4  Brute force attack 
 
This attack tries all (or a large fraction of all) possible values till the right 
value are found, also called an exhaustive search. A brute force attack is a method of 
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defeating a cryptographic scheme by trying a large number of possibilities. For 
example, exhaustively working through all possible keys in order to decrypt a 
message. In most schemes, the theoretical possibility of a brute force attack is 
recognized, but it is set up in such a way that it would be computationally infeasible 
to carry out.  
 
The output of the rule-based intrusion detection module is non-intrusive for 
few attacks such as DoS, login failures. In DoS attack, instead of having infinite 
loop, the intruder will execute the loop for larger number of times. There is a bigger 
class of attacks which doesn’t have a clear rule entry in the rule base can also be 
detected. These patterns are checked by the fuzzy IDS for a possible attack. Fuzzy 
Cognitive Mapping is used to capture different types of intrusive behavior as 
suspicious events. 
 
6. RESULTS 
 
A graph is plotted for the average time taken for scanning a single http 
request (Response time) versus the number of objects that were incorporated in the 
IDS interpreter. As the number of objects increase, the number of ways in which the 
text can be matched increases and hence the time taken also increases. From Figure 
8 it can be inferred that the response time increases linearly and then begins to 
saturate as the number of objects to be matched increases. When the number of 
objects increases beyond 80, the response time increase at a very slow rate. Hence 
the implemented IDS perform well when the number of objects is more than 80.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Performance analysis chart 
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The objects in each of the protocol field that are to be searched are plotted in 
Figure 9. It is observed that if the number of objects to be matched in each protocol 
field is increasing the Response time increases linearly. But the response time tends 
to saturate after a specific number of rules. This is because it is expected that the 
rules contain some common objects which are to be checked once thus improving 
the response time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 Response time vs. Rules for each protocol field 
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Figure 10 Performance analyses for payload 
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A graph is plotted for the average time taken for analyzing a html file, 
(Processing time) versus the payload size as shown in Figure 10. As the payload size 
increases, the amount of the text that needs to be matched increases, and so the 
processing time also increases. 
 
Figure 11 Detection Ratio with various components of IDS 
 
Figure 11 shows the detection rate with various components of IDS. From the Figure 
6.8, the detection rate increases by combining HTTP header and payload (HTML 
and Scripts). 
Figure 12 shows comparison of Fuzzy based Misuse Detection and Regular 
Misuse Detection for various attacks. Figure 6 shows the detection rate of fuzzy 
based misuse detection is high when compared to the regular misuse detection for 
some attacks such as Dos, brute force, Directory Traversal attacks.  
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Figure 12 Comparison of Fuzzy based Misuse Detection and Regular Misuse Detection 
 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
Misuse detection uses rule based IDS that follow a signature-match approach 
which is time consuming. The rule based semantic intrusion detection system 
proposed has an efficient memory usage since the amount of memory needed for 
working of the IDS depends on the rule table size.  The IDS developed, will update 
the signatures and rules automatically, because of the continuously changing nature 
of attacks. Fuzzy Intrusion Detection System proposed uses Fuzzy Cognitive 
Mapping (FCM) in order to have an accurate prediction. The complete fuzzy aided 
application layer semantic intrusion detection system has been implemented in 
Linux Platform. The system has been tested in web environment and the results are 
presented. Results show better performance in terms of the detection rate and the 
time taken to detect an intrusion.  The fuzzy aided application layer semantic 
intrusion detection system can be extended with more semantic parameters by 
considering protocols other than HTTP carrying payload other than the HTML and 
JavaScript. 
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